Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (Chevron Deference)

The Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Raimondo represents a landmark shift in administrative law, overturning the four-decade-old Chevron doctrine. The following briefing document summarizes the key aspects of this ruling, drawing on the provided excerpts from the case syllabus and opinions.

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Background of the Case:

This case concerns a challenge to a National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) rule requiring certain fishing vessels to carry observers and bear the associated costs. The petitioners, fishing businesses operating in the Atlantic herring fishery, argued that the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) did not authorize NMFS to impose these costs. The lower courts, applying the Chevron framework, deferred to the agency's interpretation of the statute.

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The Chevron Doctrine:

Prior to this case, under the Chevron doctrine, courts reviewing agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes were required to defer to the agency's interpretation, as long as it was "permissible." This two-step approach involved:

1. Determining whether Congress had directly addressed the specific question at issue.
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2. If Congress had not, deferring to the agency's interpretation if it was a "permissible" reading of the statute.
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Overturning Chevron:

In Loper Bright, the Supreme Court held that Chevron deference is incompatible with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Court found that the APA's text, particularly Section 706, assigns courts the responsibility to “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions," without differentiating between the two. The Court determined that this directive makes it clear that agencies are not entitled to deference when interpreting statutes.

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Rationale for Overturning Chevron:

• Inconsistency with the APA: The Court found Chevron's presumption of implicit delegation of interpretive authority to agencies to be at odds with the APA's directive for courts to decide questions of law.
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• Judicial Role: Chevron was seen as undermining the judiciary's essential role in interpreting statutes and serving as a check on the executive branch. By deferring to agencies, courts were seen as abdicating their duty of independent judgment.
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• Separation of Powers: Chevron was found to blur the separation of powers by allowing agencies to exercise judicial power through interpreting ambiguous statutes, potentially expanding their authority beyond constitutional limits.
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• Workability: The Court recognized that Chevron, despite numerous attempts to refine its application, remained unworkable and created confusion in its application. The Court pointed to the numerous exceptions and carve-outs that had been added to the doctrine over the years as evidence of its unworkability.
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Impact of the Ruling:

This ruling signifies a significant shift in the balance of power between the judicial and executive branches. By overturning Chevron, the Court empowers courts to exercise independent judgment in interpreting statutes, even when agencies have offered their own interpretations. This change is likely to result in more rigorous judicial scrutiny of agency actions.

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Concurring Opinions:

Justices Thomas and Gorsuch each wrote concurring opinions.

• Justice Thomas emphasized the constitutional separation of powers concerns raised by Chevron, arguing that it violated Article III by diminishing the judicial power and unconstitutionally expanding executive power.
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• Justice Gorsuch, while joining the majority opinion, provided a historical analysis of the judicial role and the doctrine of stare decisis. He argued that Chevron represented a departure from the traditional understanding of these concepts.
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Dissenting Opinion:

Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, dissented from the majority opinion.

• Justice Kagan defended Chevron, arguing that it was consistent with congressional intent and the APA. She emphasized the expertise and experience of agencies in interpreting and implementing complex statutory schemes, arguing that deference to agencies in these cases was appropriate.
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Conclusion:

The Loper Bright decision marks a turning point in administrative law. By overturning the Chevron doctrine, the Court reasserts the judiciary's role in statutory interpretation. This ruling will have far-reaching implications for how courts review agency actions in the future.

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